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Preface 
 
The outcome document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit called on countries 
to prepare national development strategies, taking into account the international 
development goals agreed in the various United Nations Summits and Conferences of 
the past two decades. In order to assist countries in this task, the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) commissioned a series of notes 
for policy-makers and policy-shapers both in the government and civil society, in 
major and interconnected areas relevant to the formulation of national development 
strategies: macroeconomic and growth policies, trade policy, investment and 
technology policies, financial policies, social policy and state-owned enterprise 
reform. The preparation of the notes received generous funding in part from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Colleagues from UNDP also 
provided helpful suggestions for and comments on the notes.   
 
The policy notes, authored by experts in these fields, draw on the experience and 
dialogues of the United Nations in the economic and social areas, complemented by 
outside knowledge. The notes provide concrete suggestions on the means to achieve 
at the national level, the internationally-agreed development goals synthesized in the 
United Nations Development Agenda. The policy notes are intended to provide those 
at the country level who shape and set policies, with a range of possible alternatives to 
the standard policy solutions that have prevailed over the past two decades, rather 
than to prescribe any single course of action. The notes serve to help countries take 
advantage of and expand their policy space - their effective room for maneuver in 
formulating and integrating national economic, social, and environmental policies.  
 
I encourage readers to see these notes as complementary inputs into the debate at the 
country level on development challenges faced and the policies needed to meet them. 
The issues chosen are vital pieces of the policy mosaic that underlies national 
development strategies, which are ultimately geared to achieving sustained economic 
growth with social inclusion and environmental protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
José Antonio Ocampo  
Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs 
United Nations 
New York, June 2007 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Governments in developing countries are responsible for important investments, e.g. 
in education and infrastructure. These investments require a view of the evolving 
structure of the economy—the design of an education system or a road network 
requires a vision of where the economy is likely to be a quarter century hence. But 
successful developing countries have had investment and technology policies that 
have gone far beyond this minimalist role. They have actively promoted particular 
sectors of the economy. Economic theory can justify such active intervention in terms 
of widespread “market failures.” Markets in developing countries do not work as 
efficiently as they do in textbooks, and many opportunities of improving productivity, 
incomes and employment are missed as a result. However, the concept of market 
failure covers many (often quite complex) issues and policy has to identify not only 
the most pressing market failures but also the ones that can be feasibly addressed 
given the institutional and fiscal capacities of the government. It is not practical to 
expect hard-pressed developing country policy-makers to carry out a comprehensive 
analysis to identify the market failures they can feasibly address in their countries. 
However, this note suggests that policy-makers can follow some simple steps to 
identify a few of the most critical components of investment and technology policies 
appropriate for their context. In particular, if they start by investigating how existing 
technologies and sectors in their countries can be upgraded to improve productivity, 
create higher wage jobs and/or create greater employment, they are likely to identify a 
number of feasible steps they can follow to achieve relatively quick results. For many 
countries this may be a sufficiently challenging goal for investment and technology 
policies. In other countries with more advanced analytical and implementation 
capacities, a more detailed analysis of market failures and feasible responses may be 
appropriate.   
II. OVERVIEW: DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT 
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
This Policy Note  will help policy-makers and civil society develop policies 
appropriate for their context in a series of steps summarized in Figure 1. The first step 
is to identify national priorities for investment and technology policy and the critical 
constraints and bottlenecks that may be preventing their achievement through a 
consultative exercise that interacts with other components of the National 
Development Strategy (NDS). This process will vary from country to country for a 
number of reasons. Data availability can vary widely, countries face different 
technological and investment bottlenecks, and have strengths and weaknesses in 
different areas. Key stakeholders may also disagree about the investment and 
technology policy priorities in different sectors like manufacturing, agriculture and 
services. Thus, at the outset, transparent procedures have to be used to identify 
priorities and bottlenecks at the country level, making the best use of available data 
and other resources, and taking into account local conditions.  
 
* This Policy Note was prepared by Mushtaq H. Khan, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of 
London,. Comments can be sent to esa@un.org 
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In countries with limited administrative and planning capacities, the first step can be 
significantly simplified by focusing on existing economic sectors and sub-sectors and 
investigating if there are obvious areas where big gains can be made in terms of 
national priorities (employment growth, employment growth for women and other 
vulnerable sections of the population, wage growth, export earnings, and so on) 
through achievable improvements in investment and technology upgrading. Backward 
and forward linkages with existing competitive sectors can also be investigated, as 
these are areas where new competitive advantage is most likely to be developed.  
The second step  in the policy-making process is to identify instruments and policy 
measures to address the most important constraints and bottlenecks that are 
preventing the achievement of the investment and technology upgrading goals 
identified in step 1. For instance, the aim may be to identify policies and instruments 
that can increase investments in critical sectors, or accelerate the adoption and 
adaptation of new technologies in these sectors. However, many reasonable policies 
may not be feasible in the context of particular countries given limitations in 
governance capacities to implement and enforce the policies adopted. These 
limitations have to be taken into account when designing policies and instruments. 
This takes us to the third step of this process.  
The third step  is to ensure that the policies and instruments discussed in step 2 can 
actually be implemented, given the governance and enforcement capacities available. 
Monitoring and implementation of policies and instruments have often been 
unsatisfactory in developing countries because of political constraints that prevent the 
correction of policy mistakes and failures of implementation. These constraints may 
be more serious for some types of policies compared to others. As Figure 1 shows, 
steps 2 and 3 involve iteration: policies identified in step 2 will often need to be re-
designed or revised given the problems of implementation assessed in step 3. The role 
of a separate analysis of governance capacity in step 3 is to ensure that policies are 
only adopted after a proper understanding of their governance and implementation 
requirements, and the likelihood of success given the institutional and political 
capabilities of the country. This step is critical for designing and selecting instruments 
and policies that are both feasible and effective .  
There are two projected policy outcomes of this process. The first expected outcome 
is a set of feasible investment and technology polic y interventions to accelerate 
progress towards critical goals in the National Development Strategy (NDS). To be 
feasible, these investment and technology policies have to be compatible with the 
existing implementation capacities of the government. They should also be 
compatible and consistent with other parts of the National Development Strategy. The 
steps suggested in Figure 1 aim to ensure that policies and instruments for investment 
and technology upgrading are tailored to local capacities and objectives, that they are 
compatible with other parts of the NDS (in particular, fiscal constraints) , and are 
implementable given available governance and implementation capacities. These 
requirements mean that a feasible investment and technology policy will address a 
relatively small number of critical constraints or bottlenecks affecting technology 
acquisition and investment in specific sectors. The second expected outcome of the 
process is the identification of critical governance weaknesses that need to be 
addressed if more effective investment and technology policies are to be attempted in 
later years. Both policy outcomes shown in Figure 1 are equally important.  
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Figure 1 
Steps in Developing a National Investment and Technology Policy 
These Policy Note is organized in three sections:  
1. The first section explains the case for investment and technology policy by 
drawing on economic theory and the experience of successful developing 
countries. While many of the most successful developing countries used 
ambitious industrial and technology policies , they also had extensive 
governance capabilities to ensure effective implementation. Contemporary 
developing countries often have more limited implementation capacities , but 
they can use pragmatic policies to overcome specific bottlenecks and 
constraints that limit investment and technology acquisition in critical sectors.  
2. The second section goes through the three stages of the  policy process shown 
in Figure 1 to establish what is involved in implementing this approach in 
different developing country contexts.  
Step 1. Identify constraints and bottlenecks that 
could be addressed by investment and 
technology policy
Step 2. Identify instruments and policies required 
for effective implementation
Step 3. Check if institutional and governance 
capacities are adequate for ensuring effective 
implementation
National needs 
assessment and dialogue 
with stakeholders
Governance priorities for NDS to 
enable more effective investment 
and technology policies in the 
future
Adjust instruments 
and policies according to 
existing  implementation 
capacities
Interaction with other 
components of pro-poor 
policies in NDS
Check compatibili ty 
with other NDS policies, 
particularly fiscal 
implications
Feasible investment and 
technology policies for the 
current National Development 
Strategy (NDS)
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3. In the final section, this approach to investment and technology policy is 
compared and contra sted with the good governance and investment climate 
reforms that developing countries are being encouraged to adopt as a way of 
enhancing investment and its efficiency. There are areas of overlap and 
complementarity, but effective investment and technology policies require the 
development of governance capabilities that go beyond  the ones identified in 
good governance reforms. 
III.  THE CASE FOR INVESTMENT AND 
TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
Countries that have achieved greater success in economic growth and poverty 
reduction rarely enjoyed better resources and skills than others from the outset. Their 
success depended on their ability to create the capacity to produce. They used 
pragmatic policies to create incentives and compulsions for investors to invest and 
acquire new technologies. But success also required state capacities to enforce these 
policies. The capacity to enforce policies varies significantly across states, and within 
the same state it can vary significantly depending on economic sectors and the rules 
being enforced. Some states are better at enforcing some policy rules, others are better 
at enforcing others. It is important to remember this when devising investment and 
technology policies for a particular country. The strategies that worked in one country 
will not necessarily be easy to implement in another.  
Economic theory identifies a series of market failures that explain why markets alone 
cannot ensure that developing countries will catch up with advanced countries. 
Developing countries with strong planning capacities could use an analysis of market 
failure to devise and prioritize their industrial and technology policy interventions. 
However, planning agencies in most developing countries are unlikely to have these 
capacities. But fortunately, it is possible to make progress by taking some pragmatic 
steps that could assist in moving up the technology ladder to better achieve some 
national development goals. The market failure analysis is important because it points 
out that even in sectors where there are potential gains from investment and 
technology upgrading this may not happen because the cost of organizing the 
necessary investment through the market may be too high because of market 
inefficiencies. Some of these market inefficiencies may be overcome through a focus 
on good governance and investment climate reforms. But other market inefficiencies 
may be difficult to overcome in the short run, and so corrective policy measures are 
required to achieve  the investment and technology upgrading directly.  
The most important market failures that can hold back investment and improvements 
in technology in developing countries include the following: 
i) Imperfections in Credit Markets: The costs and risks faced by banks in 
identifying good borrowers may squeeze out lending to potentially profitable sector s. 
Lenders do not have full information about the ability and management skills of 
entrepreneurs who come to borrow from them. In particular, borrowers who have no 
intention or ability to repay the loan may be more willing to pay higher rates of 
interest or agree to other terms lenders may impose. Thus without spending a lot of 
resources investigating the quality of borrowers, and following this up with ongoing 
monitoring, banks who impose stringent conditions on borrowers may simply end up 
attracting the worst borrowers. Since banks soon find out that this is the case, in the 
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absence of corrective interventions, they may reduce or even stop lending to 
important s ectors like industrial investors. 
ii) Imperfections in Equity Markets : Similarly, the costs and risks faced by small 
investors in identifying potentially profitable equity investments may reduce or 
prevent equity finance playing an important role in providing finance for 
development. It is not easy to set up well-working equity markets. If small 
shareholders are not well protected, an important source of investment in the stock 
market may dry up. On the other hand, if it becomes too difficult for outsiders to buy 
out small shareholders at a relatively low price if a company underperforms, the threat 
of takeover becomes less likely and it becomes easier for managers to make bad 
decisions at the expense of all share holders. Stock market regulation is difficult even 
in advanced countries and regulatory structures are always being adjusted. But even 
so, most of the finance for new investments in advanced countries typically comes 
from other sources like retained profits or bank loans. In developing countries 
regulatory capacities are much weaker, as are the capacities and compulsions on 
companies to reveal accurate data on their performance and prospects. It is not 
surprising that stock markets typically play a very limited role in developing countries 
in driving finance to new developmental sectors.  
iii) Imperfections in Insurance Markets: The cost of identifying the degree of risk 
involved in insuring against different eventualities may reduce investment in many 
sectors. In developing countries, where there are few firms in productive sectors, it is 
difficult for insurers to estimate different types of risk. In addition, developing 
countries are more susceptible to political uncertainties which are typically 
uninsurable even in advanced countries. These imperfections in insurance markets 
increase the exposure of entrepreneurs in these sectors and they may therefore be less 
likely to invest. But even in advanced countries, many of the risks involved in 
investing in new sectors are uninsurable, and investors have to absorb these 
‘uncertainties’. The difference is that advanced countries have many richer and risk-
tolerant investors who can absorb these uncertainties in the expectation of large 
potential gains if their investments work out. But in developing countries, where this 
type of investor is much more rarely found, and where foreign investors face large 
political and currency risks, many potentially profitable investments may not happen 
without public institutions absorbing some of the risks and uncertainties.  
iv) Coordination Failures: Many investments are only profitable if complementary 
investments in other areas take place. For instance, investment in a high-end garments 
industry that has to respond rapidly to changing demands may only be viable if high 
quality accessories and fabrics are locally available  and can be quickly sourced. The 
costs of coordinating these complementary investment decisions through the 
relatively inefficient markets of a developing country may prevent or reduce many 
potentially profitable investments. Government assistance in coordinating backward 
and forward linkages can yield significant gains by bringing together investors, 
sharing information and creating incentives for coordinated investments.  
v) Externalities: Many investments have benefits for other sectors and for broader 
society that may be ignored by investors in those sectors. As a result, w ithout specific 
policies to encourage investments in these sectors there may be insufficient or no 
investment in many critical sectors. A particularly important type of externality 
involves investment in training labour and management. Investment in this training is 
beneficial for the entrepreneur but it has much wider social benefits because skilled 
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labour and middle management can migrate from the firm to other firms or set up new 
businesses. The benefit to the investor is therefore less than the benefit to society and 
there is likely to be insufficient investment in these critically important activities.  
There are also locational or ‘clustering’ externalities when many firms providing 
similar services or producing similar products cluster together in particular localities. 
Each firm benefits from the availability of a pool of skilled labour, the shared 
knowledge of markets and suppliers, and the rapid diffusion of technologies across 
firms. By the same token, firms in developing countries that often do not have these 
advantages face higher costs and lower productivity growth. These market failures 
can be addressed by government action to encourage investments in activities that 
have positive externalities and to encourage clustering of firms that are likely to enjoy 
locational externalities by developing industrial parks.  
Responses: Successful developing countries have responded to market failures of the 
types discussed above w ith a number of types of interventions, including the 
provision of credit through government loan programmes, risk sharing by government 
through joint investments and insurance schemes, government assistance in 
coordination of investment in different sectors and in bargaining with external 
technology providers, and explicit or implicit subsidies or other interventions to 
encourage sectors or activities displaying positive externalities. However, apparently 
similar interventions have also failed to provide good results in some developing 
countries because appropriate governance capabilities to ensure the achievement of 
these desirable outcomes were missing. These governance capabilities are critically 
important in explaining success and failure.  
Whenever governments intervene in markets, even if it is to respond to market failure, 
they inevitably also provide opportunities for resource capture. For instance, 
incentives to attract new investors can also enable inefficient investors to obtain loans, 
capture subsidies and free ride in other ways that can ultimately undermine the 
strategy unless compulsions or sanctions are available to ensure that non-performance 
is rapidly dealt with. Efforts at coordination, government training programmes, credit 
programmes or subsidies for investment in particular sectors can thus result in waste 
rather than more rapid development.  
Governance capabilities to monitor  the outcomes of interventions and to respond 
rapidly to correct mistakes in implementation are therefore critical for success. The 
ability and willingness of governments to respond can itself create strong compulsions 
for private sector beneficiaries of these interventions to deliver results. Equally, the 
absence of these governance capabilities can result in free riding as there are few or 
no compulsions on beneficiaries to deliver results. These failures of governance can 
explain why apparently well-thought out investment and technology interventions 
have often failed in many countries. 
Developing investment and technology policies therefore requires identifying a series 
of interventions that can address the most critical market failures as well as selecting 
from this list the ones that can be effectively implemented given existing or 
achievable governance capabilities. Few developing countries can be expected to 
carry out a full analysis of market failures in different sectors to identify and prioritize 
the most important areas of intervention. For most developing countries, the most 
feasible and pragmatic approach would be a less demanding one that involved 
identifying some of the most important constraints holding back investment and 
technology upgrading in already existing sectors or in sectors that are closely related. 
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This is likely to be the most practical way of making progress with investment and 
technology policies in most developing count ries. Policies and interventions can then 
be selected based on whether effective implementation capacities exist for particular 
strategies of investment and technology upgrading.  
Most developing countries already have a few sectors where global competitive ness 
has been achieved, as measured by export competitiveness. A pragmatic way of 
identifying practical investment and technology policy interventions is to begin with 
sectors in which the country already has some experience and asking the following 
questions:  
? What can be done to increase output, productivity and employment in 
sectors where the country already has competitiveness? 
? What can be done  to move production in these sectors into higher value-
added products? 
?  How can these sectors be used as lead sectors to build backward and 
forward linkages with new upstream and downstream sectors that can raise 
domestic value added beyond existing competitive sectors?  
(In some conflict or post-conflict countries there may be no activities that currently 
enjoy international competitiveness. In these cases the pragmatic approach will be to 
identify and start with activities that are closest to achieving international 
competitiveness).  
The answers to these questions will in effect address different types of market failures 
in a pragmatic way by addressing issues of: 
· Coordinating technology acquisition decisions across firms and sectors 
· Sharing risk and enabling the financing of investment in new technologies and 
sectors  
· Sharing risks in labour training and learning processes 
· Providing targeted infrastructure to critical sectors 
· Developing regulatory capacity to maintain and enhance competitiveness 
It is best to stick to very simple criteria in making decisions about the sectors to 
support through investment and technology policies. It is a mistake to believe that 
governments in developing countries can review all possible investment options to 
identify the best ones. It is good enough to identify some good investment options on 
the basis of already existing competitive and entrepreneurial capacities. (A more 
ambitious process could also examine assistance for entirely new sectors but a 
pragmatic approach that begins with existing sectors and capacities is likely to be the 
best strategy for most countries). The criterion could be that a forum of stakeholders 
can identify potential investments that can feasibly raise productivity, employment 
and/or achieve other National Development Strategy goals by achieving economic 
rates of return through new investments within relatively short periods of time if 
feasible assistance with coordination, financing, learning, and infrastructure were 
available. The feasibility of the assistance provided depends critically on the fiscal 
and administrative capacities of the state, and its capacity to monitor improvements in 
competitiveness achieved through these policies and take prompt corrective action if 
required. These issues are discussed in turn.  
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Coordination of technology acquisition across firms and sectors 
In Taiwan Province of  China (hereafter, Taiwan PoC), from the 1950s, and South 
Korea, from the 1960s, government-led institutions brought together potential 
investors in different sectors to coordinate their technology acquisition. The goals 
were to ensure the compatibility of  technologies in different sectors, to ensure that 
critical backward and forward linkages were achieved, and to ensure that investments 
in high value-added products that were sensitive to complementary investments were 
not lost. These types of coordination can significantly enhance the incentives for 
investing in higher productivity sectors.  
In addition, the coordination of potential domestic investors, particularly in higher 
technology sectors, helped to enhance the bargaining power and information available 
to domestic investors in their transactions with external technology providers. During 
the early stages of Taiwan PoC’s development the government even took the lead in 
identifying and licensing critical electronic technologies for domestic producers. The 
goal of these coordination strategies was to ensure that domestic producers had access 
to technologies that allowed higher productivity growth over time.  
In theory, private investors should do all the coordinating themselves to maximize 
their potential profits. In reality, private investors face high costs of collecting the 
relevant information and even higher costs of negotiating and reaching agreement 
with other investors when there are disagreements about the package of investments 
they should collectively invest in. Economists call these costs transaction costs, and 
they are typically very high in developing and transition economies where institutions 
for generating information are underdeveloped and contracts are difficult to enforce. 
Developing country investors are likely to be particularly disadvantaged in their 
access to information about alternative technologies that are available in international 
markets. The point here is not that governments have better information about 
technologies, but rather that governments may have an advantage in bringing together 
different investors and providing a forum where options for upgrading existing sectors 
and technologies can be discussed.  
For coordination to be successful, policy-makers have to be able to follow up on 
shared information to develop integrated policies to assist technology acquisition in 
the critical areas identified. The exercise is not just about information sharing 
between, say, garments manufacturers, accessory manufacturers, the dyeing industry 
and potential investors in textiles, but also and primarily about following up on 
discussions with policies to assist and accelerate technology acquisition in these 
critical sectors.  
In many developing countries coordination efforts exist on paper, but little 
coordination happens in practice. Often, this is because government agencies charged 
with improving investment coordination are given low priority within government, 
and have limited access to higher level policy-makers. 
One way in which government agencies can play a meaningful role in effective 
coordination is by working as an effective forum through which domestic investors 
can collectively bargain with foreign technology providers to purchase a package of 
integrated technologies. If coordination enhances the information available to 
individual investors and their bargaining power when trying to acquire better 
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technologies from abroad, this can provide the incentives to individual investors to 
take coordination efforts seriously.  
A key to the success of this aspect of industrial policy in South Korea or Taiwan PoC 
was that coordination efforts in these countries were supported by the highest 
executive levels of government, and effective incentives were provided to individual 
investors to part icipate in technology coordination exercises. In addition, despite their 
considerable bureaucratic capabilities, coordination efforts were limited to a few 
sectors at a time to avoid overstretching the available capabilities of the government.  
  
Sharing risk and enabling the financing of investment in potentially 
profitable sectors 
An important component of investment and technology policies in all high-growth 
developing countries has been government strategies to make finance available to 
critical sectors. The market failure this addresses is the inability of investors in many 
critical sectors to get access to finance at the market rate of interest. So even if finance 
is made available to critical sectors at the market rate  of interest, this could release an 
important bottleneck. But in fact in many high-growth countries, government policies 
made finance available to critical sectors at below market rates.  
Market failure happens here because investment and technology acquisition in new 
areas is an inherently risky activity. If credit and equity markets fail, finance is either 
not available, or more typically, is available but at a price or with collateral conditions 
that load all the risk on the investor. This can prevent investment in new areas where 
investors are unwilling to add to the high levels of risk they face in bringing in the 
new technologies by taking on finance at a high cost of capital or at high risk to 
themselves through mortgaging significant assets. 
At the same time, governance capabilities are critical here to ensure that free riding 
does not reduce such strategies to failure. If credit is made available to investors who 
would not otherwise have had access to it, the agencies providing credit have to make 
sure it is not wasted. A number of strategies can be used by governments to reduce the 
risk of poor performance. Making finance available at market rates of interest reduces 
the risk that the borrower will put in suboptimal levels of effort because the borrower 
has to generate adequate returns to service the loan. But this does not remove the risk 
entirely because the borrower may have no intention of repaying a loan that has 
ultimately been arranged by government.  
Similarly, government equity holdings in the company that is financed may improve 
performance by creating incentives for government to monitor and risks for the firm if 
performance is poor as the government could decide to sell its holdings to more 
aggressive investors. But again, these strategies are only likely to work in the 
presence of credible threats on the part of government to act in case of poor 
performance and the presence of a well-working stock market. These may not be 
present to the requisite degree in many developing countries.  
The credibility of corrective government action in the face of poor performance is the 
key. If the government has credibility, rather simple mechanisms may be sufficient to 
create strong compulsions for the borrower to perform. For instance, in South Korea, 
lending institutions involved in financing new investments in critical sectors during its 
industrial takeoff set simple performance targets for borrowers, usually in the form of 
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easy to monitor export targets. Failure to meet these targets normally resulted in 
growing pressure on the enterprise from banks and from the government, and could 
eventually result in a transfer of the asset to new owners.  
Developing countries have to think through in the context of their own institutions 
and political conditions how they can achieve credible sanctions for firms benefiting 
from industrial policy financing arrangements if they fail to perform. What they need 
to achieve is an effective government strategy to recover financing through a fast 
track process from enterprises that have failed to perform. The  general effectiveness 
of bankruptcy laws or of stock markets as mechanisms of imposing discipline on 
borrowers is limited on their own in most developing countries.  
Effective pressure on industrial policy borrowers may therefore depend on the 
creation of  additional and specialized governance and recovery arrangements that 
create credible compulsions for industrial policy borrowers to exert high levels of 
effort in making their investments viable. For instance, government equity holdings in 
these firms could be held by specialized agencies with a clear mandate to monitor 
performance according to pre-arranged criteria and to terminate the relationship if 
necessary. Such agencies would be credible only if they had clear backing at the 
highest political levels.  
Sharing risk in labour training and learning processes 
Market failures in organizing training and learning processes are an important 
impediment to technology upgrading in developing countries. The productivity gap 
between advanced and developing countries is typically much bigger than the wage 
gap, particularly in high value-added sectors. This explains why despite very low 
wages, developing countries find it so hard to move into high value-added sectors. 
The productivity gap is only partly due to poor infrastructure and the level of 
education of the workforce. It is primarily due to the fact that productivity growth in 
manufacturing often requires learning-by-doing, and labour productivity can typically 
only be raised in the workplace by operating production for a time at a loss measured 
in international prices. This is the main reason why financing for new technology 
investments is so critical. But market failures in lending and equity markets can in 
turn prevent the adequate availability of finance for  organizing learning-by-doing. 
Successful industrial and technology policies in countries like South Korea, Taiwan 
PoC and Malaysia have involved governments sharing some of the risk and 
uncertainty of learning new technologies. This has taken the form of government 
financing of some of the costs of learning combined with the withdrawal of support 
when learning fails. The latter was particularly important as success depended on the 
credibility of strategies of withdrawal if learning failed to take place. The credibility 
of withdrawal created the appropriate compulsions for firms and industries receiving 
support to put in the effort and achieve actual productivity increases.  
In contrast, many other developing countries attempted to accelerate catching up 
using similar policies, but without effective state capacity to withdraw support or 
otherwise enforce learning. In these cases, state support for technology acquisition 
only resulted in infant industries that never grew up. As a result of widespread failure 
with these strategies, most developing countries abandoned this approach entirely. But 
infant industry policies failed in most developing countries because the incentives 
created for catching up were not combined with effective compulsions or sanctions 
for sectors or firms that failed to achieve satisfactory competitiveness over time.  
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The policy space for major interventions in this area has shrunk in most developing 
countries. With much greater levels of trade openness following WTO agreements in 
many developing countries, sharing the risk of learning requires a mix of instruments 
that will not violate the trade agreements. However, specific efforts to improve or 
accelerate learning in critical areas are not only possible, but essential, if 
technological pr ogress is to be assured. For this to be effective, policy-makers must 
have the capacity not only to support learning, but also to withdraw support rapidly if 
competitiveness does not improve.  
These instruments can be devised, and can include:  
· support for  learning in the form of fiscal and other incentives for setting up in-
firm training schemes; 
· assistance through targeted infrastructure for sectors involved in learning, and  
· bridging loans to finance learning.  
Many incentive schemes continue to exist and operate in developing countries since 
WTO rules do not prohibit many forms of assistance for technological catching up. 
The problem is that these schemes are often not properly thought through in terms of 
the results expected, performance is not monitored, and no effective sanctions or 
systems for withdrawing support exist. Unsurprisingly, the results are almost always 
disappointing.  
The capacity to devise appropriate risk-sharing instruments is therefore a necessary 
capacity for overcoming technology bottlenecks in developing countries. Secondly, 
outcomes in most cases have been poor because of poor capacities for effectively 
implementing strategies. In particular, agencies involved in managing incentives for 
learning have to be linked to executive agenc ies that have the institutional and 
political capacity to enforce the withdrawal of support or enforce other sanctions if 
learning fails to show results within the expected time period. The latter remains a 
critical condition for success. In many developing and transition economies, 
developing these governance capacities is not just a matter of strengthening 
bureaucratic capacities, but also of creating political coalitions that will allow these 
policies to be effectively implemented.  
Providing targeted infrastructure to critical sectors 
The importance of infrastructure for economic development is widely recognized, but 
when infrastructure cannot be improved rapidly across the board , identifying sectors 
that are critical for achieving national development targets and prioritizing 
infrastructure to these sectors can pay high dividends. In this context, infrastructure 
should be broadly interpreted to include both physical and human capital; hence, it 
includes the ability of the state to provide resources for skills development 
appropriate to the needs of critical sectors.  
The capacity to identify infrastructural priorities and to deliver high quality 
infrastructure to these critical sectors can significantly improve the incentives for 
investing in high-productivity sectors, or in sectors deemed desirable according to the 
objectives of the National Development Strategy.  
This capacity to deliver high quality infrastructure to critical sectors when 
infrastructure cannot be rapidly improved across the board is a vital capacity for 
accelerating investment. It can also dramatically improve the bargaining power of 
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government in negotiating technology transfer deals with foreign investors. Foreign 
investors bringing in high productivity technologies sensitive to the quality of the 
infrastructure are more likely to invest and to negotiate with countries that can 
credibly offer them the required infrastructure. One reason why China continues to 
attract more foreign investment than any other developing country is that 
infrastructure can be prioritized in China to facilitate rapid investments in critical 
areas. 
In addition, the capacity to provide targeted infrastructure can be a mechanism for 
providing conditional support to particular sectors and technologies for sharing the 
risks of learning.  
However, the ability to deliver quality infrastructure, even if limited to priority 
sectors, assumes some minimal fiscal capacities of the state. In some developing 
countries, even this may not be available. In such circumstances, macroeconomic 
issues have to be addressed, in particular to increase tax collection and to limit 
spending in unproductive sectors.  
Developing regulatory capacity to maintain and enhance 
competitiveness 
A crosscutting issue affecting all the questions discussed above is the capacity of 
government to enhance and maintain competitiveness through industrial and 
technology policies. Competitiveness is the capacity to produce products at a price 
and of a quality that can survive in open competition with the best of  the rest. 
Competitiveness is measured by the relative unit costs of production at home 
compared to the international price of products of similar quality. The aim of 
industrial and technology policies must be to achieve competitiveness in new higher 
technology and higher value-added investments. These investments can then survive 
without further assistance, providing jobs, higher wages and other benefits for the rest 
of the economy. Competitiveness is not the same thing as competition. Competition is 
the act of buying and selling in an open market with free entry and exit for other 
buyers and sellers. The degree of competition in a market can be measured by the 
degree of freedom of entry and exit into that particular market. Under some 
conditions, competition can ensure the achievement and maintenance of 
competitiveness. But in other cases, particularly when industrial and technology 
policies are involved, competition may not be sufficient and other governance 
capabilities are necessary to ensure competitive ness.  
In theory, if investors have to survive in competitive markets with free entry and exit 
for domestic and international firms, they can only do so by maximizing their 
investment in new technologies and making all efforts to sustain learning and best 
practices within their enterprise. As a result, competition can ensure that entrepreneurs 
maintain their competitiveness by innovating or by copying innovators. Since this is a 
hard life, from Adam Smith onwards, economists have also recognized that invest ors 
have a natural tendency to try and restrict competition in their own sectors, as this 
allows them to survive with lower productivity, greater inefficiency, and yet achieve 
high profits by being able to charge consumers higher prices (Rajan and Zingales 
2003).  
Not surprisingly, competition policy has traditionally been an important plank for 
ensuring competitiveness, especially in advanced countries. States in advanced 
countries typically have government agencies charged with investigating and 
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punishing anti-competitive arrangements and collusion between producers, as well as 
regulating prices in sectors where only a few large firms can operate. However, 
competition policy is not always as simple as this. It is not always the case that more 
competition is better than less (though that is true in most cases). For instance, 
innovating firms in advanced countries have to be allowed to make extra profits to 
maintain the incentive to innovate. For these firms, too much competition can cut into 
their profits too soon, and this can be a problem. Of course, too little competition is 
also a problem, as it reduces the incentive to keep on improving products and 
technologies. Thus, in many critical innovating sectors in advanced countries, there is 
an optimal level of competition that is neither too much nor too little (Aghion and 
others, 2002). It follows that regulatory bodies have to have the capacity and 
personnel to make these judgements on an ongoing basis.  
What is true for advanced countries applies with greater force to developing countries. 
Regulatory bodies must have the capacity to make judgements, on an ongoing basis, 
about competition and competitiveness, particularly in the context of industrial and 
technology policies. In many sectors, high levels of competition may well be the best 
policy for ensuring competitiveness over time. These sectors are generally those that 
have already achieved international competitiveness or can achieve it very rapidly. 
Low technology export sectors, like the garments industry, which already have global 
competitiveness in many developing countries, are examples of sectors that should 
maintain competitiveness through competition. In other sectors that are catching up, 
and are being supported by industrial and technology policies, more sophisticated 
regulatory capacities are required.  
Whenever a sector gets policy support in any of the ways described earlier for 
acquiring new technology and catching up, competition as a mechanism for enforcing 
competitiveness becomes insufficient. The sector receiving support has an advantage 
over others, both over other sectors within the country and, more importantly, over 
producers of similar goods in other countries. As a result, the sector can maintain its 
market share in a superficially competitive setting, even though it is not yet 
competitive in the sense that it would not be able to survive without the assistance. In 
these cases, institutions have to be set up to complement market competition in order 
to ensure the rapid achievement and maintenance of true international 
competitiveness, so that the support currently being received can be phased out.  
For instance, if learning in new industries is supported through subsidies for training 
programmes, or access to better or cheaper infrastructure, complementary institutional 
measures are required to ensure that the support is for a pre -determined period, or that 
it is conditional on continuing improvements in performance, measured by export 
growth or some other easy-to-observe indicator. Without these measures, the support 
policy is likely to fail, and international competitiveness will probably not be 
achieved, because the sector will depend on the continuation of support instead of 
using the opportunity to catch up to achieve true competitiveness. This type of failure 
happened in many of the developing countries’ catching-up programmes that 
produced infants which never grew up.  Clearly, issues of coordination, financing, 
learning, infrastructure and competitiveness are closely related and require integrated 
policy responses on the part of government. Box 1 summarizes this discussion. 
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Box 1  
Investment and Technology Policies: 
Justification and First Steps 
Market failures in credit markets, equity markets, insurance markets, coordination failures 
and externalities can prevent developing countries moving up the value-added chain to create 
high wage employment and raise living standards. In particular, without targeted policies to 
enhance productivity through learning-by-doing, developing countries can get stuck in low 
productivity and low wage activities.  
The least demanding industrial and technology policy approach in developing countries is to 
start with already existing competitive activities and ask: 
? What can be done to increase output, productivity and employment in areas 
where the country already has competitiveness? 
? What can be done to move production in these sectors into higher value-
added products? 
?  How can these areas be used as lead sectors to build backward and forward 
linkages with new upstream and downstream sectors that can raise domestic value 
added beyond existing competitive sectors? 
The aim is to achieve internationally competitive sectors enjoying high productivity and the 
potential of rapid productivity growth within relatively short time periods using industrial and 
technology policies of some or all of the following types : 
· Coordinating technology acquisition decisions across firms and sectors 
· Sharing risk and enabling the financing of investment in new technologies and 
sectors  
· Sharing risks in labour training and learning processes 
· Providing targeted infrastructure to critical sectors 
· Developing regulatory capacity to maintain and enhance competitiveness 
 
The mix of policies will depend on the technologies being adopted and the pre-existing 
strengths and weaknesses of entrepreneurs, financial institutions, infrastructure and skills in 
the sector. The critical determinant of success is likely to be governance and regulatory 
capacities to maintain and enhance competitiveness thro ugh monitoring and taking tough 
action when required, including the early withdrawal of support if progress is unsatisfactory.  
While most countries have tried variants of industrial and technology policies in the past, the 
main cause of their differential success has often been the efficacy with which incentives have 
been implemented, and the credibility with which their withdrawal has been organized in 
cases of poor performance.   
(Sources: Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Aoki and others 1997; Khan and Jomo 2000) 
IV. STEPS IN DEVELOPING AN INVESTMENT AND 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
Step 1. Identifying sectors to support  
The implicit market failures that have to be addressed by investment and technology 
policy will be different in different countries because their economic sec tors have 
developed to different levels and they may face very specific problems. For instance, 
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developing and transition countries have different initial conditions and levels of 
development of different sectors (agriculture, industry and services), different initial 
technical capacities and skills of entrepreneurs and workers in different sectors, the 
characteristics and limitations of the ir financial systems and infrastructure are likely 
to be different, and in particular, their governance capabilities may be different from 
other countries and vary from sector to sector within the country.  
Thus, the first task is to examine the available data and evidence on investment and 
technology in the national economy, and to engage in a discussion with key 
stakeholders to identify the constraints that need to be addressed to move existing 
competitive sectors up the technology ladder and to establish possible backward and 
forward linkages with these sectors. As this is the first step in the policy-making 
process, not all of the priorities identified at this stage may be selected for policy 
attention after all steps in the process outlined in Figure 1  have been completed. The 
ultimate aim is to select a smaller number of interventions that are feasible given the 
resources and governance capacities available to policy-makers. However, it is 
desirable for the national debate and consultation to be as comprehensive as possible, 
and to be based on the best available sources of data and evidence on sectors where 
national competitiveness already exists and the constraints and bottlenecks faced by 
these sectors in trying to further improve productivity and gain international 
competitiveness in higher value -added production. 
Data Requirements  
The data available for assessing national performance in investment and technology 
are likely to vary across countries, both in extent and in quality. The more refined the 
available data, the better informed the identification of constraints and bottlenecks. 
Hence, improvements in data collection and processing by national statistical agencies 
are an important part of improvements in policy-making in this area. However, a start 
can be made with relatively crude data that should be available in almost every 
developing country.  
Table 1 summarizes some of the data that would be useful for determining national 
investment and technology priorities according to the objectives identified in the 
National Development Strategy. The table indicates the types of data that are relevant, 
but not all of it will be available in every developing country. Policy progress can be 
achieved with much less. In some countries, other sources of data can usefully 
complement the information available for identifying constraints and setting 
priorities. 
This data provides the starting point for policy-makers to identify areas where 
investment and technology policies could make a difference to National Development 
Strategy objectives. It should also allow more informed discussions with stakeholders 
to identify the areas where investment and technology policies can make the biggest 
impact on output, productivity, employment and other development objectives.  
The outcome of examining the data and the discussion with stakeholders should result 
in the identification of a number of priority areas where investment and technology 
policies can assist technology upgrading, productivity growth and the development of 
backward and forward linkages in sectors that already have some experience of 
operating at or close to international competitiveness. The next two steps will seek to 
narrow down the list of possible areas of assistance to a relatively small number that 
can be addressed given the implementation and fiscal capacities of the state. The aim 
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in these later stages will be prioritization, to impose discipline on the policy wish list 
and to force policy-makers and stakeholders to agree on a shorter list of feasible 
policy priorities. Feasibility very much depends on the limits to policy set by fiscal 
constraints and the implementation capacities of the state, particularly in critical areas 
of governance required for successful implementation of investment and technology 
policies. In the medium term, improving these governance capacities to ensure 
effective implementation and improving fiscal possibilities to enable support to be 
more extensive and to cover more sectors should also be the subject of investment and 
technology policies.  
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Data on Critical Economic Sectors and Technologies  
The starting point for identifying investment and technology policy priorities is to 
collect and examine the most basic data about the economy: its important sectors and 
sub-sectors, its aggregate and sectoral performance in terms of growth, productivity 
growth, employment growth, export growth, and so on, as shown in the first item in 
Table 1. The data give us a picture of the allocation and efficiency of investment in 
the past. It also provides information on the characteristics of different sectors and 
sub-sectors of the economy in terms of employment, productivity, wages, and so on, 
both relative to other sub-sectors in the economy, and relative to comparable 
competitors. Identifying critical sectors that could be prioritized by investment and 
technology policies can be made more tractable  by identifying sectors within the 
country that have already achieved international competitiveness or are close to 
international competitiveness. (Sector in this context refers to an area of productive 
activity, so the ready-made garments industry, or commercial horticulture is an 
example of a sector in this sense).  
It is theoretically possible that there may be potential sectors that do not yet exist at 
all where (with the right policy push) the developing country may enjoy large gains in 
employment, output or productivity growth. But given the limited resources that most 
developing country policy-makers have to carry out a full analysis of market failures 
that may prevent some potentially profitable sectors from emerging at all, a second-
best and pragmatic approach is to start with what appears to be working and 
investigate how these sectors can be used as the base for investment and technology 
policy in the ways identified in Box 1. In many developing countries, the sectors that 
are at or close to international competitiveness are likely to be sectors using labour-
intensive technologies to produce manufactured or agricultural products for export 
markets. The data can help to identify these sectors, and although in many cases these 
sectors will already be well-known to policy-makers , the data will back up the case 
for further investigation.  
The initial data are also useful for identifying the direction in which more advanced 
developing countries that had similar sectoral specializations in the past have moved. 
Did they move into higher-value products within these sectors , into higher 
productivity methods of production, what backward and forward linkages did they 
develop? For some sectors, this investigation may reveal that the sector does not offer 
many possibilities for upward mobility in terms of productivity, or linkages, compared 
to other sectors. This information will be very useful for prioritizing sectors for 
attention. For instance, if a country has international markets in ready-made garments 
and in producing stuffed soft toys, an examination of trajectories of more advanced 
developing countries could show that ready-made garments have greater potential for 
productivity upgrading and linkages than stuffed toys. A very precise calculation of 
potential growth or productivity improvement in different sectors is not necessary. But 
policy-makers should have data and evidence at hand for stakeholder discussions that 
aim to identify the most likely sectors where productivity and technology upgrading is 
feasible on the basis of existing national competences and international evidence of 
possible improvements.  
Discussions about national priorities are likely to be contested by potential winners 
and losers from particular policy positions. At this stage of the exercise , the task is 
simply to collate the data and information on different sectors and sub-sectors in the 
most transparent way possible. 
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Data on Investment and Investment Performance 
The second item in Table 1 describes data that can be used to assess the share and 
allocation of investment in the economy at a number of different levels: aggregate and 
sectoral, and also in specific categories like infrastructure, human capital, and 
investment in the private and public sectors. Long-term economic growth depends on 
both the magnitude of investment and the efficiency of investment. Thus, the first 
item of Table 1 gave us data on economic growth, productivity growth and so on; the 
second item measures the share and allocation of investment across sectors and in the 
economy. The relative efficiency of investment between sectors or countries can be 
deduced from these two sets of data. The higher the historical rates of growth 
achieved for any given rate of investment, the more efficient the investment.  
Box 2  
Sectoral Choices in the National Development Strategy 
For many developing countries, identifying major technological challenges for upgrading and 
extending their competitive sectors is a relatively simple task. What is required is data on the 
technologies used by other developing countries that are in similar industries but have moved 
further up the technology ladder. The policy-making process can look for evidence on how 
upgrading the value of products produced, improving productivity or product quality was 
achieved in more advanced countries and the results these countries achieved in areas 
important for the National Development Strategy, such as employment generation, wage 
growth, output growth, export growth or other indicators. This comparison of present with 
potential conditions in competitive sectors can suffice to identify the directions of upgrading 
that appropriate investment and technology policies should aim to achieve. 
However, the national development strategy also needs to consider whether the existing 
competitive sectors and activities in the country are desirable to maintain and extend over the 
long term, or whether steps should be taken to develop some sectors over others. There may 
be many factors to consider here, many specific to particular countries. For instance, if 
agricultural landholdings are very fragmented and there is significant landlessness in 
agriculture, or if agricultural land is very poor in quality and suffers from significant 
ecological or environmental handicaps, it may be prudent to focus  on a faster development of 
high value-added industry or services to create a greater proportion of non-agricultural jobs in 
the future.  
A further consideration that could inform the choice of sectors to prioritize is the statistical 
observation that a faster growth of the manufacturing sector tends to result in faster growth in 
productivity in the manufacturing sector, adding to its competitiveness and allowing faster 
growth to be sustained (Kaldor 1966). Because such a relationship between output growth and 
productivity growth is not in general observed in the agricultural or service sectors, many 
economists have argued that developing countries trying to raise social productivity on a 
sustained basis should put somewhat more emphasis on the manufacturing sector as an engine 
of growth. In addition to the possibility of virtuous cycles of productivity and output growth, 
it is also often easier to generate large increases in employment in manufacturing compared to 
agriculture or services.  
Policy-makers need to take these statistical observations seriously but in many developing 
countries, some high value-added service or agricultural activities have created many 
relatively high wage jobs. A good example of this is the business-outsourcing sector in India. 
There may be questions about the rate of employment growth in India compared to China 
where the manufacturing sector is growing much faster, but developing countries should not 
ignore high value-added sub-sectors in services and agriculture even though in general it is 
still true that manufacturing offers the most plausible source of employment growth for low-
skilled workers. 
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Data on investment, particularly at the level of sectors is typically weak in developing 
countries and sometimes entirely unavailable. Nevertheless, it is useful to marshal the 
available data to see if some or all of the following questions can be answered. This 
will help in the policy discussion about directions of upgrading and sectoral priorities. 
First, it would be useful to know the  areas of the economy in which significant public 
and private investments are taking place. Secondly, are these the areas where 
international competitiveness exists and needs to be further developed? Thirdly, what 
can we deduce about the efficiency of these investments from the output or 
productivity growth that has been achieved through these investments? The answers 
to these questions may indicate either that not enough investments are being made in 
critical sectors where competitiveness can be further developed, or that the 
investments that are being made are not achieving the output or productivity that 
competitors are achieving.  
If national data on investment at the sectoral level is not available to answer these 
questions, policy-makers can still proceed with second best data on the types of 
investment that are taking place in sectors that are internationally competitive by 
looking at the types of output and export growth that the country is achieving. Is the 
growth in exports in sectors with international competitiveness primarily of low 
value-added products, or are there signs of moving up the value-added chain over a 
number of years, as indicated by changes in the average value of exports in these 
sectors? If the growth of exports is low, this is an indirect indication of insufficient 
investment in increasing output or keeping up with growing competitive pressures 
coming from other countries. If output is growing, but the unit value of exports in 
these sectors is moving up very slowly or not at all, this may be an indication that 
investments are primarily in output expansion rather than in technological upgrading.  
In some countries, the absence of investment data means that policy discussions may 
have to proceed on the basis of such indirect evidence on the scale and type of 
investment in critical sectors. This may be sufficient for initiating some steps in 
investment and technology policy, but better statistical data would be an important 
priority in these countries for future policy development.  
Information on Constraints  
The third item in Table 1 describes the most important type of information required 
for informing a national debate on investment and technology policy. The information 
discussed earlier identifies critical competitive sectors, and their performance and 
limitations. It should also identify the types of technologies and products that are 
feasible next stages for upgrading in these sectors on the basis of the experience of 
more advanced developing countries. The critical question here is why the upgrading 
has not already happened. There may be important market failures that may be 
preventing upgrading and new investments taking place in these sectors, and 
preventing the development of backward and forward linkages with new competitive 
sectors.  
The information that is available to assess the constraints that may be preventing 
upgrading and technological progress is typically not quantitative data, but qualitative 
information that can be used to answer a number of questions that follow from the 
discussion of market failures summarized in Box 1. If investment or technical 
progress is slow in competitive sectors, why is that so? It could be that progress into 
new higher value products or higher productivity technologies involves coordination, 
or risks or learning costs or finance of a type or extent that is deterring investment in 
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this sector (see Box 1 for a summary of the issues). Identifying the most important 
constraints that are relevant for a particular sector can only be achieved through a 
process of qualitative assessment of what is blocking the appropriate investment in 
that sector based on consulting industry associations, leading entrepreneurs in that 
sector, local and foreign technical experts, particularly those working in similar 
sectors in more advanced developing countries that have achieved technical progress, 
as well as other domestic stakeholders.   
This largely qualitative information can help to identify the specific constraints and 
bottlenecks preventing the developing country from: i) increasing investments in 
sectors that are internationally competitive or close to achieving international 
competitiveness, ii) investing in upgrading technologies and improving productivity 
in these sectors and iii) developing new backward and forward linkages to create new 
competitive activities.  
While dialogue with investors and industry or sectoral associations is an important 
source of information, the procedure here cannot simply be to carry out surveys, but 
to go beyond surveys on the basis of the comparative data available (some of it 
referred to in the first two items of Table 1). Comparative data are very important 
because investors and industry associations are, on their own, likely to give responses 
based on conventional wisdom that are not necessarily the most important constraints 
faced by a developing economy in a comparative perspective. For instance, investors 
in all developing countries want to see improvements in good governance and are 
likely to respond to general surveys by identifying the absence of good governance as 
the most important constraint to technology acquisition and long-term investment in 
the country. In the final section of this Policy Note , we will see that while these 
responses are perfectly understandable, they do not translate into an achievable policy 
goal for most developing countries.  
In particular, we have seen that at early stages of development, many developing 
countries can begin to perform better and to converge with advanced countries even 
when they are not able to achieve significant improvements in good governance 
conditions in the short run. The evidence from successful high-growth countries is 
that while immediate improvements in ‘good governance’ are hard to achieve, 
successful countries ha ve governance capacities that enable them to overcome 
specific investment and technology constraints in an effective and pragmatic way.  
It follows that surveys of investors should be designed to identify pragmatic steps to 
overcome specific problems that may be constraining investment in new technologies 
and developing new products using the expertise already existing in internationally 
competitive sectors. Critically, the opinion of domestic producers and entrepreneurs 
should be complemented with information and evidence from more advanced 
developing countries to identify the processes and possibilities of value and 
productivity enhancement in existing competitive sectors, and the possibilities of 
developing profitable backward and forward linkages. The types of issues that policy-
makers can assist with and should look for in a general sense are the ones we have 
already discussed and summarized in Box 1.  
Thus, the dialogue with stakeholders should try to identify steps that can be taken to 
improve the (effective) coordination of technology acquisition, improve the 
information available and assist with the process of bargaining with external 
technology providers, relax financing constraints, share some of the financial and 
other risks involved in learning, and provide effective targeted infrastructure to 
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critical sectors. Policy-makers also have to be concerned with improving institutional 
arrangements for ensuring that competitiveness is rapidly achieved through these 
interventions, a requirement that is absolutely necessary for the successful 
implementation of all the other measures referred to. The particular policy focus that 
could be most appropriate will be different in different contexts, depending on the 
characteristics of the country and the technologies being absorbed (see Box 3). 
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Box 3  
Identifying possible areas where investment and technology policies may be useful 
 
Identifying a list of possible areas where investment and technology policies may assist 
output, productivity and/or employment growth involves a number of steps. The possible list 
will later be narrowed down further when implementation and governance capacities are 
taken into account. 
i) Use national and international evidence to identify activities where the country already has 
international competitiveness or is close to achieving international competitiveness. These 
activities are in any case very obvious as they will be activities producing products or services 
that the country is already successfully exporting.  
ii) Use national and international evidence to identify the magnitude and efficiency of 
investment in these areas: is output increasing over time, is productivity improving over time 
(measured by the maintenance of market share against competitors) is product quality 
(measured by unit values) improving over time, are new products being added to the portfolio 
of products produced by the sectors in question? 
iii) Use primarily international evidence from more advanced developing countries to identify 
the extent to which these sectors can serve as critical sectors for upgrading products (to higher 
value products), improve productivity (to allow higher wage employment and to maintain 
competitiveness), establish backward and forward linkages (to develop other sectors of the 
economy and to enhance competitiveness of existing sectors). The conclusion here may be to 
reject some sectors as likely candidates for significant upgrading attempts and the 
identification of others as possible candidates. 
 
 
Example 1. Poor developing country with low investment rate  
Economic sectors (not an exhaustive list) include: a low productivity peasant agriculture, a 
low productivity garments manufacturing export sector enjoying international 
competitiveness, and a medium productivity large scale chemical industry built under import 
protection that is currently far from international competitiveness. 
Examples of areas where investment and technology policies could be useful  
i.  Absence of backward linkages in the garments industry, necessitating the import of 
all accessories and of finished fabrics, some of which could be domestically 
produced. Potential for enhancing investment and technology acquisition through 
coordination, financing and sharing risks in introducing new machineries to improve 
product quality and move up the value chain, introducing on-the-job training 
programmes for workers and middle management to increase supply of skilled labour 
and share risks and costs of financing learning-by-doing.   
ii. Large losses in chemical industry preclude internal investment to upgrade. Potential 
of enhancing investment and competitiveness through risk-sharing to bring in new 
investment (possibly foreign partnerships attracted with special incentives that are 
clearly defined over limited time periods and tied to performance outcomes), 
coordinating tie-ups with foreign and domestic buyers to increase markets and change 
product mix to serve new markets.  
iii.  Emerging export crops in agricultural sector constrained by low bargaining power in 
foreign markets to attract necessary investments in quality control, refrigeration, and 
marketing. Potential of offering selective incentives to foreign technology providers 
to attract new technologies , coordinating marketing of high-value products like 
horticulture or fisheries with foreign ret ailers (possibly with special incentives limited 
in time and tied to specific performance outcomes).  
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Step 2. Identifying instruments and policies for effective 
implementation 
The next two steps (see Figure 1) involve limiting the number of potential areas of 
policy intervention to a manageable number of areas where it is both feasible to 
intervene and where the payoff, in terms of contributing to the achievement of 
national development goals, is likely to be large. Step 2 is simply matching a number 
of policy interventions to the list of possible areas of intervention identified in Step 1, 
keeping in mind that institutional capacities of most developing country bureaucracies 
are limited and a further narrowing of options may be necessary once governance 
capacities are specifically taken into account in the next step.  
Given the very different activities and competitive sectors in different countries, 
different strategies may be appropriate for improving productivity and employment in 
each context. The general areas where theoretical market failures may be operating 
and where pragmatic policy interventions may be justified are summarized in Box 1. 
These broad areas of concern (coordination, financing, learning and so on) can 
provide decision-makers with a template for discussing various pragmatic policies.  
The most appropriate way to proceed, for countries that do not already have a 
successful track record in investment and technology policies, is to begin with a 
relatively modest set of policies, observe implementation for a few years, and then 
move on to more ambitious programmes or to re-design existing programmes as 
necessary. Given that the types of interventions that are likely to be necessary or 
feasible will vary significantly across countries, we can only consider some examples 
of policies and interventions that may be appropriate in terms of the policy goals 
discussed and summarized in Box 1.  
Coordination of technology acquisition across firms and sectors 
At the practical level, coordination requires setting up agencies with the effective 
power to bring together industrial, trade and business associations, identify areas 
Example 2. Middle income developing country with moderate investment rate  
Economic sectors include significant large-scale manufacturing sector suffering from low 
competitiveness in many sub-sectors; international competitiveness is achieved in a limited 
number of niche manufacturing and service sectors; low productivity large farms dominate 
agricultural sector. 
Examples of areas where investment and technology policies could be useful  
i.  Foreign technology and investment in potentially competitive large-scale 
manufacturing constrained by poor infrastructure and the risk of slow progress in 
learning. Scope for targeted infrastructure support and assistance in  financing on-the-
job learning to attract high-technology multinational investment and licensing of 
technology. 
ii. Absence of coordination within potentially successful clusters of manufacturing 
(engineering, electronics, etc.) to acquire higher productivity technologies. Potential 
for coordination and assistance in bargaining with foreign technology suppliers and 
investors.  
iii.  High value-added agricultural products constrained by lack of infrastructure and high 
risk in moving into high-value export crops. Scope for targeted infrastructure for 
some agricultural sectors.  
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where coordination of investment, production or marketing can enhance 
competitiveness across the board, and then follow this up with pragmatic policies to 
achieve these outcomes. The leadership of these agencies is critical. Successful 
countries often relied on lateral transfers to bring in enterprising and experienced 
individuals, often from the private sector to lead critical agencies tasked with 
industrial and technological upgrading. The agency leadership will have the task of 
assessing the data, identifying technologies and coordination strategies that are likely 
to achieve productivity, output, or employment growth (as prioritized in the National 
Development Strategy) and following that up with feasible incentives to achieve the 
coordination.  
To be effective, the agency leadership also needs to have the support of the executive 
to achieve credibility for the incentives and arrangements that are available . These 
incentives could range from technology licensing coordinated through the agency, to 
fiscal or infrastructural incentives to achieve coordinated investments. External 
technology providers and investors are also much more likely to engage in 
negotiations on the type s of technology transferred in investments or through 
licensing to domestic producers if effective government backing for agreements is 
visible and credible.  
Sharing risk and enabling the financing of investment  
Market failures in credit and stock markets are very likely in developing countries. 
The provision of targeted credit to critical sectors to finance investment in new 
technologies and in backward and forward linkages is likely to be an important part of 
effective investment and technology policies.  
Loans from banks at market rates of interest may overcome critical constraints, and 
these loans are more likely from commercial or public sector banks if the government 
is closely involved in the coordination of these investments and in policing 
performance. Entrepreneurs may be unwilling to borrow on the relatively brief 
repayment time scale s required by private commercial banks backed by their personal 
collateral. But they may be willing to accept a longer term contract with a credible 
claim on their asset that lenders may effectively exercise with government support if 
competitiveness is not achieved and repayment is at risk.  
The government may also finance technology acquisition and productivity upgrading 
through equity purchases in companies. This too needs to be credibly constructed so 
that entrepreneurs risk effectively losing control of their companies if performance is 
poor. Otherwise, there is little credible compulsion on businesses to put in effort to the 
fullest extent to raise productivity and achieve rapid learning after receiving 
government supported financing for technology acquisition.  
Sharing Risk in labour training and learning processes 
The problem of low labour productivity at the initial stages of introducing new 
technologies and processes can often deter their introduction. At the initial stages, 
while learning-by-doing is still going on, the individual entrepreneur financing 
learning will face losses. However, if learning is successful, the entrepreneur can 
eventually become profitable, but the skilled labour may now decide to leave the firm 
as other entrepreneurs copy the success of the pioneers. This external effect can in 
turn deter the individual investor undertaking these investments in learning.  
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As industrial skills are a public good, coordinated strategies for acquiring these in-
firm skills are therefore justified.  
A number of different types of schemes can be used to share the risks and costs of in-
firm learning. The government can assist with in -firm training schemes where  skilled 
personnel from more advanced developing countries are invited to train labour of 
different categories either within the firm or in training agencies that closely mimic 
firm environments. In the past, learning could be financed through various subsidy 
schemes, including protection for infant industries, but these are increasingly difficult 
and some schemes are entirely disallowed under WTO rules. Most developing 
countries are coming under WTO jurisdiction and the country agreements they have 
signed up to need to be carefully examined in designing firm-level training support 
schemes to ensure that they do not inadvertently fall foul of WTO rules. As most 
types of labour training are allowed under free trade agreements, a careful design of 
training schemes such that they do not amount to a free subsidy for the firm should 
enable these schemes to be legally introduced.  
Providing targeted infrastructure to critical sectors 
These interventions are part of any coordinated strategy to accelerate technology 
acquisition and upgrading in critical sectors. Fiscal constraints in developing countries 
prevent across the board improvement in infrastructure at early stages of 
development. However, if investment and technology policy agencies are well 
coordinated with the relevant public works ministries and the finance ministry, the 
critical infrastructural bottlenecks that may be constraining investments in 
competitive sectors seeking to upgrade can be overcome.  
This approach involves making transport networks, utilities and other infrastructure 
available on a prioritized basis for sectors that are also part of a coordinated strategy 
of investment and technological upgrading. Clearly, an effective policy of prioritizing 
infrastructure for some sectors requires support from the highest executive levels if it 
is to be actually implemented. Once again, leadership of investment and technology 
policy agencies and close contact and support from the executive are critical for 
effective implementation.  
Developing regulatory capacity to maintain and enhance 
competitiveness 
None of the investment and technology acquisition strategies discussed above are 
likely to work if complementary regulatory capacities are missing to ensure that 
supported sectors do not free ride on the support to maintain low productivity beyond 
reasonable learning periods.  
We have seen earlier that interventions that seek to change the level and type of 
investment must, by their nature, assist some investors more than others. As long as 
the support policies continue, market competition is not sufficient for ensuring that 
underlying competitiveness is increasing at the desired rate. An important compulsion 
for productivity growth and learning is now the credibility of government promises to 
withdraw support if performance is poor, or even to reclaim loans or other support 
offered by acquiring ownership of designated assets and either selling them, or more 
likely, re-allocating them to new and more efficient ownership. Once again, 
competent and professional regulatory agencies have to be developed to work in 
parallel with agencies offering support to devise appropriate performance criteria, 
particularly for monitoring loans and other forms of financial support.  
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Box 4  
Examples of investment and technology policies 
in our hypothetical developing countries 
Example 1. Poor developing country with low investment rate 
i.  Create an effective coordinating body to bring together investors in garments and 
related industries, particularly those with strong backward linkages to garments. 
Constructing integrated incentives to encourage investments in backward linkage 
sectors. Getting expert opinion on upgrading technologies used in the garments 
industry, to improve styling, packaging and marketing to move up the value chain. 
Identifying risk factors and determining the type and extent of risk-sharing that may 
be warranted. If market finance is not available  on terms that existing producers will 
accept for technology upgrading loans, consider equity or loan schemes for garment 
producers investing in new technologies to improve productivity or product value, 
backed by strong and credible withdrawal strategies if performance is poor. In-firm 
training schemes to train workers in new technologies and improve productivity 
through learning-by-doing when new machinery is introduced.  
ii. Set up a high-powered agency to consult with foreign technology providers and 
identify the investment required and the risks involved in upgrading the loss-making 
chemical industry. Investment may be required both in fixed capital, but also in 
changing management styles and/or changing management. Offer incentives to 
foreign investors bringing in designated technologies and markets to share risk. 
Incentives can take the form of targeted or prioritized infrastructure, tax reductions 
over designated periods, fast-track approvals and so on.   
iii.  For high value agricultural products, offer selective incentives to foreign technology 
providers or domestic firms investing in new technologies to upgrade quality control, 
refrigeration, and marketing. Strengthen critical regulatory functions to ensure that 
pre-agreed targets and competitiveness improvements are achieved.  
Example 2. Middle income developing country with moderate investment rate  
i.  Set up a high-powered agency to identify investment and technology upgrading 
required for converting currently uncompetitive large-scale enterprises into profitable 
enterprises enjoying international competitiveness. Provide incentives for foreign 
investors bringing in designated technologies and investments to share risks. This 
could include prioritized infrastructure, tax breaks, more liberal profit repatriation 
over designated periods, and so on. Adding the credibility and weight of government 
can assure foreign investors that appropriate regulatory structures, fiscal incentives 
and infrastructural support will be available. Develop regulatory agencies to monitor 
progress and set time limits for support.  
ii. Set up coordinating agency to identify and bring together investors in critical clusters 
of industry (engineering, electronics etc.) to identify possibilities of technology 
upgrading and backward and forward linkages. Involve government in bargaining 
with foreign technology suppliers and investors, offering prioritized infrastructure 
and tax and other incentives if required.  
iii.  Provide targeted infrastructure for high value-added agricultural sectors or sectors 
deemed to contribute to the national development plan. Regulatory support is 
particularly important in preventing wastage of support in the relatively dispersed 
agricultural sector.  
 
Box 4 shows examples of some of types of policies that may emerge through the 
consultation process in the hypothetical developing countries discussed in Box 3.  
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Step 3. Are institutional and governance capacities adequate for 
effective implementation? 
This is the last of the three steps identified in Figure 1. From the list of possible policy 
interventions identified in step 2, it is now prudent to only select the policies that can 
be effectively implemented given the emerging regulatory and implementation 
capacities of the government. The costs associated with overstretch are more serious 
than the costs associated with a more modest rate of progress in introducing 
investment and technology policy. This is because failure associated with excessively 
ambitious policies can result in the demoralization of policy-makers and of the 
enterprise sector, and indeed undermine the broader political support behind the 
strategy. These setbacks can therefore be serious in having lasting negative effects on 
the gradual enhancement of investment and technology policy capacities in 
developing countries. 
At this stage of the policy-making process, the political and executive leadership of 
government have to consider very carefully the bureaucratic and political 
requirements for the effective implementation of particular policies. The bureaucratic 
requirements include being able to recruit the appropriate high-powered and 
experienced personnel with an exposure, not just to business in that particular country, 
but also to countries at more advanced stages of using technologies that the 
developing country is aspiring to. This is a serious constraint, but is a less serious 
constraint than trying to reform the entire bureaucracy. A few effective people at the 
top, charged with carrying out a very narrow remit of policies, can achieve significant 
success, provided clear and effective political backing is forthcoming for these 
policies.  
The political requirements of effective investment and technology policies are much 
more demanding, and vary depending on the types of interventions being attempted. 
This could make some types of interventions viable while others not, and it is at this 
stage that non-viable or non-implementable policie s should be temporarily 
abandoned, while the requisite bureaucratic and political capacities are being 
developed.  
The political requirements include, but are not restricted to the following:  
· First, the political leadership should be open enough and legitimate enough to 
be able to engage in a national dialogue about investment and technology 
priorities without appearing to be engaged in a sham discourse that intends to 
benefit supporters of the current regime. Support for investment and 
technology policy can be developed on a non-partisan basis by involving, 
from the outset, all industry associations and stakeholders regardless of their 
partisan and factional affiliations.  
If the discussion is seen to be open and responsive, and if the beneficiaries of 
policies come from a broad range of camps, the political conditions for 
successful implementation can be achieved. The consultation exercise should 
not be treated as one that tries to ‘optimize’ the selection of sectors that should 
be prioritized, since there are many grey areas and an accurate optimization 
would be impossible in any case. Rather, the task of consultation should be 
one of selecting a number of important sectors on which to concentrate the 
limited fiscal and regulatory capacities of the state to accelerate national 
development. This realization can allow a number of diverse sectors to be 
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selected for upgrading to defuse tensions and limit unnecessary rent seeking 
that seeks to influence government policy. But it has to be recognized that 
these minimal conditions do not hold in some developing countries, and in 
these cases, progress will be more limited. In these countries, effort has to be 
first put into constructing a broad political support behind investment and 
technology policies by engaging with business and trade associations.  
· A second political condition required for more ambitious interventions to 
assist learning and provide targeted infrastructure is for regulatory agencies to 
have the effective capacity to negotiate regulatory agreements and withdraw 
support or assistance from sectors that fail to achieve regulatory targets. This 
capacity is not just a bureaucratic or institutional capacity (although that is 
also required); it is primarily a political capacity because regulatory agencies 
have to have the ability to withdraw support if necessary even from favoured 
clients of the government. While rent seeking and corruption are widespread 
in many developing countries, the variant of corruption that involves the 
political protection of powerful clients has often been the main reason for the 
failure of investment and technology policies in developing countries (Khan 
1996, 2002, 2006).  
Developing countries that cannot ensure the separation of the regulation of 
investment and technology policy from the horse-trading of patron-client 
politics are unlikely to succeed in these strategies. Note that what is required 
for success is not the much more demanding task of reducing corruption and 
rent seeking across the board. What is required is the much less stringent 
condition that only the critical regulatory agencies charged with implementing 
and regulating investment and technology strategies should be insulated from 
rent seeking and political interference.  The greater the consensus on the 
importance of this, the greater the chances of success. In the absence of any 
consensus within the main political parties, the chances of success are more 
limited and it may be better to limit investment and technology policies to 
areas where ongoing regulatory management is not required. For instance, 
coordination and the provision of help in bargaining with external technology 
providers are less onerous in terms of regulatory requirements than sharing 
risks in technology acquisition through the provision of finance or prioritized 
infrastructure provision. 
The final stage of the policy-making process should take these considerations and 
other political constraints into account to further limit the range of policies being 
considered to those that can actually be implemented, given existing political and 
institutional realities (see Figure 1). This is not necessarily a minimalist approach, 
since current investment and technology policy can also identify appropriate 
governance reforms to address some of the political and institutional conditions that 
would allow more extensive investment and technology policies to  be attempted in 
subsequent years. We conclude with Box 5, which suggests how the policies 
identified in Box 4 for our two hypothetical countries need to be further whittled 
down in line with the current (hypothetical) governance capacities of the two 
countries. The exercise also identifies the relevant governance reforms that need to be 
prioritized in each country.  
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A final check is now required to ensure that the policies going forward as national 
investment and technology policies have fiscal implications consistent with the 
macroeconomic policy and fiscal claims of other policies.  
The conclusion of the process described above should lead to two types of policy 
outcomes:  
First, we should be able to identify a pragmatic and feasible set of investment and 
technology policies that can make a contribution to the broader goals of the National 
Development Strategy. Depending on the economic characteristics of the country and 
its existing governance capacities, these policies may be more or less extensive.  
But secondly, we should also be able to identify a number of critical governance 
priorities that can go ahead as recommendations from policy-makers involved in 
investment and technology policy as necessary conditions for proceeding further with 
Box 5  
Final selection of investment and technology policies  
in our two hypothetical developing countries 
Example 1. Poor developing country with low investment rate  
· Current institutional and governance capacities: Weak bureaucracy, but has capacity 
to appoint competent professionals at the top of critical agencies. Political party in power 
enjoys broad legitimacy and is willing to concede entry to rival factions in determining 
industrial policy.  
· Selection of policies from Box 4: All three types of policies discussed in Box 4 are 
potentially feasible in this case. Nevertheless, given bureaucratic limitations, it would be 
prudent to begin with progress on one of these sectors, say by setting up a coordinating 
body for upgrading the garments sector and its backward linkages. If there is observable 
progress, policy can be extended to other sectors in subsequent years.  
· Identification of governance priorities for strengthening Investment and 
Technology Policy in the future: Further strengthening of bureaucratic capabilities in 
key regulatory agencies. Building on consensus between major parties by 
institutionalizing joint consultations on key investment and technology issues. 
Example 2. Middle income developing country with moderate investment rate  
· Current institutional and governance capacities: Moderately competent bureaucracy; 
capacity to appoint competent professionals to head key agencies. But politics is 
intensely competitive between competing factional parties, with no agreement on 
national priorities or possibility of reaching agreement in the short term. Rapid turnover 
of parties with short time horizons. 
· Selection of policies from Box 4: Regulatory capacities for providing targete d 
infrastructure or risk sharing finance to enable upgrading of uncompetitive large-scale 
enterprises or the agricultural sector are unlikely to be sufficiently effective. A 
coordination agency for identifying technology requirements and upgrading in the major 
industrial clusters may be the most appropriate place to start, providing shared 
information and creating pressure on government for targeted infrastructure and fiscal 
incentives. However, even these can, at best, be modest, given the absence of regulatory 
capacities to ensure improvement in competitiveness.  
· Identification of governance priorities for strengthening Investment and 
Technology Policy in the future: The main priority in this case would be to attempt to 
construct a minimal consensus between the competing parties on national investment and 
technology priorities. Political skill needs to be deployed to identify joint benefits for 
clients of different factions to allow national strategies to be identified and implemented.  
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national strategy. These governance priorities are inevitably going to be more limited 
than the broad good governance reforms that come from the conventional reform 
agenda. This is an advantage, because concentrating on a limited and relevant set of 
governance reforms that have some chance of being partially achieved, can 
significantly improve the relevance of governance reforms and their impact on 
development outcomes.  
V. INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
COMPARED WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE AND 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE REFORMS  
Investment and technology policies often do not receive very detailed attention in 
many developing countries in their national policy-making process. Instead, it is often 
assumed that general reforms to improve good governance and the investment climate  
will indirectly improve the quantity and quality of investment, and help to attract 
better and more productive technologies. While these reforms are highly desirable in 
themselves, there are good reasons why the implementation of good governance 
reforms in developing countries is likely to be very slow , and have a very limited 
impact on improving investment and technology acquisition over a reasonable 
planning horizon. A reliance on these policies alone is therefore likely to result in lost 
opportunities for enhancing investment and technology acquisition in many 
developing countries. This section provides policy-makers with some basic arguments 
for not relying exclusively on good governance and investment climate reforms, and 
instead focusing on appropriate pragmatic governance reforms that can improve the 
implementation of effective investment and technology policies. 
In making the case for a dedicated investment and technology policy, it is important to 
understand the case for the good governance and investment climate approaches, their 
merits but also their limitations. Given the importance and appeal of many good 
governance reforms as goals in their own right, an evaluation of the limits of these 
reforms for achieving other objectives is particularly important. Figure 2 summarizes 
the policy priorities of the good governance and investment climate approaches and 
the linkages through which these reform priorities are expected to lead to increased 
investments and to improvements in technology.  
These approaches stress ‘horizontal’ policies in that they do not target specific 
investment or technology bottlenecks. Rather, they seek to improve the institutional 
and infrastructural environment in which investments and technology decisions are 
made. The expectation in these approaches is that if the general environment in which 
a market economy operates can be improved, market efficiency will improve and 
better investment and technology decisions will follow. In a poor economy with 
insufficient investment and poor technology, the expectation is that an improvement 
in market efficiency and in essential infrastructure will lead to increased private 
investment and the adoption of superior technologies.  
In the good governance and investment climate approaches, the main constraint to 
long term investments in developing countries is assumed to be the absence of 
efficient markets where investors have the confidence to invest for the long term. The 
critical requirement for efficient markets is that market participants should be able to 
contract complex exchanges at low ‘transaction cost’, and for this, we require stable 
property rights and a rule of law. Stable property rights and the rule of law are the 
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critical factors that allow complex contracting at low cost. These characteristics are 
therefore necessary if markets are to allow high levels of investment and investments 
that take a long-term perspective.  
However, in developing country markets, the costs of finding trading partners, making 
contracts, and particularly of enforcing contracts are notoriously high. These high 
transaction costs can, in general, be attributed to insecure property rights and 
contracts, and these, in turn, therefore explain why private investment is low and of 
low quality. With insecure property rights, many investors simply do not invest. In 
addition, investors stay away from high technology investments with long gestation 
periods as these investments, in particular, require stable and complex contracts for 
investors taking significant risks. The good governance approach therefore focuses on 
a series of governance reforms that address the problem of weak property rights and 
contracts that, in turn, prevent markets in developing countries from operating 
efficiently.  
This is elaborated in Figure 2. Important reform priorities in this approach are to 
improve the rule of law and to constrain state and non-state expropriators from 
threatening to expropriate private property. In addition, transaction costs are also 
raised by rampant corruption which forces investors to work their way around a maze 
of restrictions and demands for bribes. Thus, anti-corruption strategies play an 
important role in the good governance reform agenda. Finally, political stability is 
required to ensure policy continuity and to reduce uncertainty about future 
expropriation.  
Figure 2 
Good Governance and Investment Climate Reform Priorities 
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These requirements define the reform priorities for good governance reforms in 
developing countries. Many of these reforms are desirable for their own sake, but in 
the good governance approach, they are also necessary means for improving market 
efficiency, and thereby, increasing investment and enabling investment in more 
complex higher technology sectors. This is why governance is increasingly at the top 
of the reform agenda in many developing countries, and these reforms often also 
dominate the reform agenda for investment and technology policy.  
The investment climate approach agrees about the importance of these governance 
reforms and adds that public infrastructure is often also essential to attract more and 
better investment. These infrastructure requirements include the efficient supply of 
utilities like electricity, water, telecommunications, roads, railways and ports. It is 
assumed that improvements in the accountability of government and improvements in 
the quality of bureaucrats in key service delivery areas will lead to more effective 
delivery of key public infrastructure. The size of the bureaucracy should therefore be 
reduced and the remaining bureaucrats should be selected for quality and paid 
properly.  
Clearly, many of these reform agendas are interdependent; for instance, accountability 
reforms should improve political stability and reduce corruption, while anti-
corruption reforms should improve the quality of public infrastructure. The quality of 
infrastructure has a direct effect on investment. With better infrastructure, investments 
become more profitable, thereby increasing both the quantity of investment and 
investment in high productivity areas that are more sensitive to the quality of 
infrastructure.  
As summarized in Figure 2, these theoretical considerations lead the good governance 
and investment climate approaches to argue that reforms in these areas will lead to 
more investment and better quality investment in developing countries. In support of 
these theoretical arguments, a large number of studies have found correlations 
between measures of good governance and the growth rate, the rate of investment, 
and the rate of R&D expenditures in developing countries (Knack and Keefer 1995, 
1997; Mauro 1997; Kauf fman and others 1999).  
While these reforms are highly desirable in themselves, as the central policy plank for 
achieving better investment and technology performance, the good governance and 
investment climate approaches are inadequate for most developing countries. It is 
important to understand why. We argue that specific policies and instruments are 
required to directly tackle some of the bottlenecks in investment and technology 
upgrading, and that such policies are more likely to yield results in the context of 
most developing countries. 
Limitations of Good Governance and Investment Climate Reforms 
The good governance and investment climate reform priorities seek to achieve 
governance and infrastructure goals that are desirable in themselves. But in many 
developing countries, progress in achieving good governance goals and infrastructure 
improvements across the board is likely to be very slow, with a correspondingly 
limited impact on investment and technology acquisition.  
However, significant progress in achieving good governance goals –  in particular the 
key goals of stable property rights, a satisfactory rule of law or significant reductions 
in corruption – requires substantial fiscal resources to finance the requisite policing 
and enforcement of property rights and contracts (Figure 3). Achieving stable 
 38 
property rights is one of the most expensive public goods, as evidenced by the size of 
the transaction cost sector in advanced countries like the United States, which by 
some estimates, absorbs close to half the country’s GDP (North and Wallis 1987).  
In other words, stable property rights and low transaction costs at the point of 
exchange in advanced countries can only be achieved if significant expenditures of 
resources in legal costs, public policing, private arbitration, legalized and regulated 
lobbying, political processes, and so on can take place.  
Given the expense involved, and the intense competition for fiscal resources in 
developing countries, it is not surprising that developing countries that have set 
themselves the target of achieving good governance improvements have not, in 
general, achieved significant success in improving their governance indicators in the 
short to medium term. For very similar reasons, it is not easy to rapidly improve the 
quality of infrastructure across the board in developing countries, given fiscal 
constraints and the intense political competition for fiscal resources.  
Thus, for most developing countries, achieving good governance and infrastructure 
improvements across the board have proved very difficult to achieve, even when the 
political will has been there and these goals have been identified as reform priorities. 
It follows that if progress on these fronts is slow, progress in investment and in 
technology adoption that depends on improvements on these fronts is also likely to be 
very slow. This is summarized in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Limitations of Good Governance and Investment Climate Approaches 
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Given the economic constraints preventing the achievement of stable property rights 
and low transaction costs across the board in poor countries, it is not surprising that 
the historical evidence shows that high-growth developing countries did not achieve 
significantly higher property right stability than low growth developing countries. 
Figure 4 uses the composite property rights index (IRIS-3 2000) constructed by 
Knack and Keefer at the IRIS centre at Maryland as an aggregate of indices for 
corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, contract repudiation, and expropriation 
risk. Figure 4 uses the 1990 values of the property rights index for all available 
countries, and compares their growth rates over the next 13 years for which data are 
available.  
While there is a weak positive relationship discernible between better governance 
according to the good governance indicators, and the growth rate (just as the good 
governance policy approach asserts), we do not observe any significant difference in 
the average score or the range of scores when we compare high and low growth 
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developing countries. In Figure 4, advanced countries are shown with blue diamonds, 
converging developing countries (with growth rates higher than the median advanced 
country growth rate) are shown with green squares and diverging developing 
countries (with growth rates lower than the median advanced country growth rate) are 
shown with red triangles. The important observation is that high growth developing 
countries had, on average, a very similar mean score and dispersion on good 
governance indicators compared to low growth developing countries (Khan 2004; 
DESA 2006).  
Figure 4 
Composite Property Rights Index and Growth, 1990-2003  
(using Knack -IRIS data) 
 
What this shows is that high-growth developers did not, in general, succeed because 
their average property right stability was significantly higher than that of low-growth 
developers, and they certainly did not have property right stability comparable to 
advanced countries. Given what we know about the cost of providing the public 
goods required for achieving stable property rights and effective contract enforcement 
systems, it would be surprising if the observation was otherwise. Similarly, while  it is 
undoubtedly true that better infrastructure is preferable for investment, growth 
takeoffs in high-growth countries have not waited for across-the-board improvements 
in infrastructure. Rather, as growth took off, infrastructure improvements became 
easier to finance, and better infrastructure made further investments more profitable, 
thereby setting off virtuous cycles. Exactly the same is true for expenditure on 
property right stabilization and further improvements in the investment climate.  
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Critical Governance Capacities required for Investment and 
Technology Policy versus Good Governance Capacities 
The discussion of policy measures, through which investment and technology 
acquisition can be accelerated, has identified a number of critical governance 
capacities that states in developing countries need to have if they are to successfully 
implement these types of policies and programmes. For instance, for some investment 
and technology policies, governance capacities have to be developed to identify areas 
of technology coordination and to follow up coordination discussions with effective 
policies to overcome bottlenecks. In the case of other policies that seek to accelerate 
learning or to improve competitiveness, governance capacities are required to ide ntify 
and deal with failing performance through the withdrawal of support and the transfer 
of support to other sectors and technologies (Khan 2000). Managing exit from support 
strategies is one of the critical governance capacities required for the success of 
investment and technology policies.  
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This ana lysis clearly shifts the focus 
of governance reforms appropriate 
for investment and technology policy 
away from the broad good 
governance reforms that many 
developing countries are already 
trying to implement, often with very 
little success. This does not mean 
that the goals of good governance are 
unimportant. Good governance goals 
are desirable on their own terms, and 
developing countries should attempt 
to maximize their achievement of 
these goals at every stage of 
development. But it does mean that 
the attempt to improve these 
conditions to any significant extent 
with very limited fiscal and reform 
capacities is too ambitious, and the 
expected effects on investment and 
technology acquisition are likely to 
be low. While good governance 
reforms are desirable  on their own 
terms, developing countries should 
not exclusively depend on these 
policies to improve their investment 
and technology performance.  
The capacity to address critical 
market failures that may prevent 
investment and technology 
upgrading and the capacity to 
prioritize a few sectors at a time has 
often been wrongly characterized as 
a strategy of ‘picking winners’. If 
investment and technology policy 
really depended on the foresight of 
policy-makers to pick winners, its 
potential success would indeed be 
highly questionable. In reality, success in investment and technology policy of the 
type we have been describing has been based on a pragmatic identification of 
bottlenecks and constraints hindering progress in critical economic sectors, combined 
with the institutional and political capability to respond to continuing poor 
performance by changing policies or changing the focus of policies towards other 
priority sectors (see Box 6).  
Box 6  
Investment and Technology Policy 
is not about ‘Picking Winners’ 
‘Horizontal’ policies of improving the investment 
climate are likely to take too long to produce 
significant improvements across the board in 
most developing countries . Not surprisingly, 
successful developing countries have always had 
specific investment and technology policies to 
overcome the most important bottlenecks. At any 
particular time, these policies implicitly favour 
some sectors over others, though these change 
rapidly over time as bottlenecks are overcome. 
As a result, investment and technology policies 
have often been misleadingly described as 
policies of ‘picking winners’.  
In fact, bureaucrats, politicians or industry 
associations are likely to be frequently wrong if 
they were trying to pick ‘winning’ sectors or 
technologies for support.  
In reality, successful investment and technology 
policy is based on a pragmatic identification of a 
few bottlenecks and constraints that are 
preventing critical sectors from improving 
competitiveness and moving up the technology 
ladder. Rather than the ability to pick winners, 
successful countries have had the capacity to 
change policies if investment and technology 
performance in priority sectors turned out to be 
poor. The capacity to change policy or to shift 
focus to other sectors is a critical and necessary 
condition to ensure success. Ex post flexibility of 
response, rather than the ex ante ability to pick 
winners, has distinguished success from failure in 
investment and technology policy. Successful 
investment and technology policies did not 
‘pick’ winners, rather they helped to ‘make’ 
winners, and if winners could not be made in 
some sectors, policy shifted quickly to other 
promising sectors. 
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